My long-distance pal Mathias Jessen pointed out this article today on Twitter, in which the article's author attempts to make us all shudder in fright at the idea that Microsoft Active Directory has a terrifying security vulnerability that will cause the world's corporate infrastructure to crumble and shatter humanity's socio-political status quo as script-kiddies take over the now destabilized Earth.
OK, it's not all that bad...
Of the several encryption types that AD supports for Kerberos authentication, RC4-HMAC is among the oldest and the weakest. The reason the algorithm is still supported? You guessed it... backwards compatibility. The problem is that in this (perhaps ill-conceived, but hindsight's 20/20) implementation of RC4-HMAC, as outlined in RFC 4757, the encryption key that is used is the user's NT/MD4 hash itself! What this means is that all I need is the NT hash of another user, and by forcing an AD domain controller to negotiate down to RC4-HMAC, I can be granted a Kerberos ticket as that other user. (Getting another user's NT hash means I've probably already owned some random domain-joined workstation, for instance.)
As you probably already know, an NT hash is essentially password-equivalent and should be treated with the same level of sensitivity as the password itself. And if you didn't know that, then you should read my earlier blog post where I talk a lot more about this stuff.
This was a deliberate design decision - that is, Microsoft is not going to just patch this away. The reason they chose to do it this way was to ease the transition from NTLM to Kerberos back around the release of Windows 2000. Newer versions of Windows such as Vista, 2008, 2008 R2, etc., use newer, better algorithms such as AES256_HMAC_SHA1 that do not use an NT hash. Newer versions of Windows on a domain will automatically use these newer encryption types by default, but the older types such as the dreaded RC4-HMAC are still supported and can be used by down-level clients... or malicious users pretending to be down-level domain members.
As an administrator, you're free to turn the encryption type off entirely if you do not need the backwards compatibility. Which you probably don't unless you're still rockin' some NT 4.0 servers or some other legacy application from the '90s.
(Which probably means most companies...)
Edit the Default Domain Controllers (or equivalent) Group Policy and look for the setting:
Computer Configuration > Policies > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network Security: Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos.
This setting corresponds to the msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes LDAP attribute on the domain controller computer objects in AD. Enable the policy setting and uncheck the first three encryption types.
And of course, test in a lab first to ensure all your apps and equipment that uses AD authentication can deal with the new setting before applying it to production.